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I. INTRODUCTION
A S THE use of software-based systems in nuclear instrumentation and control (NI&C) area is on the increase, various kinds of software safety evaluation methods and measures, which have been proposed in many studies [1] - [5] , have been reviewed by nuclear engineers. Software safety requires a comprehensive approach, using more than one technique. Thus, the software safety technique may include testing, formal development methods (including proofs of correctness), expert judgment, and other factors. While software itself cannot be unsafe, it can issue commands that place the system in an unsafe state. Furthermore, the control should be able to detect when factors beyond the control of the computer place the system in a hazardous state and to take steps to eliminate the hazard or, if that is not possible, initiate procedures to minimize the hazard [1] . A hazard is a set of conditions within a state from which there is a path to a mishap, which is an unplanned event or series of events that results in death, injury, illness, or damage to or loss of property or equipment. Mishaps can be classified according to severity from "catastrophic" to "negligible." In most software safety studies only severity of hazards is considered and not the probability or possibility of the hazard occurring or of leading to a mishap. This is too pessimistic an approach to enable the software designer to use a more sophisticated definition of risk and to derive measurements for risk or safety from the software quality model. Thus it is desirable to turn our minds to the probability or possibility of hazards as well as to their severity when we consider risk or safety.
Most quality control methods are apt to rely on the measurements related to reliability of the software system. Whereas system reliability deals with the problems of ensuring that a system, including all hardware and software subsystems, performs a required task or mission for a specified time in a specified environment, system safety is concerned only with ensuring that a mishap does not occur in the process. As for safety-related software systems, safety is more important than any other quality factors. Therefore, a safety-oriented quality control is desirable for the development of safety-related software systems.
In the area of software development it would be of great benefit to predict, as early in the development as possible, those components of the software system that are likely to have a high error rate or that need high development effort. In order to succeed with this goal, many studies have proposed quality control methods, which are summarized in Section II. Quality control consists of comparing observed quality with expected quality and minimizing the effort expended on correcting the sources of defects. In order to achieve an indication of software quality, the software must be subjected to measurement. Most research has suggested quality control methods based on the measurement data from other projects that have already been performed. However, it is desirable to improve the methods in order to tailor them for safety critical applications. As for the software projects for safety-related applications like NI&C systems, it is very difficult to collect measurement data from past projects because they are required to be ultra-high reliable and thus developers are usually reluctant to offer the measurement data about their projects. In this case, it would be efficient and desirable to control the quality with a method that enables us to predict safety through analyzing measurement data from an on-going project without collecting measures or indicators of quality or productivity factors from past projects. In addition, the measurement is an additional burden for the designers. Although most previous research requires the measurement apart from the verification of software (i.e., hazard analysis and requirement analysis at the early development stage), it is desirable to integrate the measurement and the verification. Since software safety begins with 0018-9499/00$10.00 © 2000 IEEE a hazard analysis and is strongly related to requirement analysis, it can be a desirable way to integrate the measures that can be obtained from the analyses. We have proposed the measures in this work.
Quality factors to be predicted during the development of a software system are affected by many product and/or process attributes, e.g., software design characteristics or the underlying development process and its environment. Hence there is a lot of need to introduce experts' knowledge. Ebert introduced fuzzy reasoning to software quality control because experts' knowledge covers the vague frontiers between good quality and bad quality with linguistic uncertainty and fuzziness [6] . As Ebert pointed out, in order to be accepted by software engineers and normal users, a quality control method should have an explanation facility that provides how the conclusion is arrived at and how the inference engine makes use of the knowledge provided by the fuzzy production rules. In other words, it is necessary to offer a formal framework for the classification method. Performing a work similar to the Ebert's, we tried to proceed to a further study by providing Fuzzy Colored Petri Net (FCPN) as the formal framework. FCPN is a fuzzy extension of Colored Petri Net (CPN) [7] , keeping all of the CPN properties and its architecture. FCPN is briefly described in Section III, which is also expected to facilitate the knowledge representation, modification, or verification.
Briefly, in this work, we propose a new measure-based safety classification method, trying to deal with the aspects mentioned above. In this method, we predict the safety of the software components and then classify the software components according to the degree of safety. The method can be used earlier than at the detailed design phase. Through the proposed quality control method, high-quality NI&C systems can be developed effectively and used safely. Section IV describes the safety classification method. Section V demonstrates the feasibility of it and offers more details through an application example.
II. RELATED WORKS
Most software quality control methods are based on measures and statistics. There have been a few approaches of integrating software measures and statistical techniques. Multivariate analyses techniques provide feedback about relationships between components (e.g., factor analysis) [8] , [9] . Classification techniques help determine outliers (e.g., error-prone components) [10] . Finally, detailed diagrams and tables provide insight into the reasons why distinct components are potential outliers and how to improve them [11] . In this paper, we are focusing on classification techniques because we are trying to predict software safety and classify the components of software systems through a similar approach. The prediction is based on software measures. However, we adopted fuzzy approximate reasoning rather than statistical techniques.
An example for a metric-based decision environment for knowledge-based systems has been suggested by Behrendt et al. [12] . This tool is based on a factorial quality taxonomy that classifies quality factors (e.g., reusability) and related subfactors (e.g., modularity) into linguistic categories (e.g., "not acceptable"). Another tool for assessing risk factors of software components has been developed by Porter and Selby [10] . The tool generates measurement-based models of high-risk components automatically, based on metrics from previous releases or projects. These models are built according to a classification tree with binary and multivalue decision nodes. While the first approach permits the use of linguistic descriptions and qualitative reasoning without describing how the classes had been created, the latter is based on history-based crisp decisions that do not indicate any intuitiveness. Although both approaches clearly try to solve the problem of metric-based decision support, it is often not clear how to justify the decisions. The most serious constraint imposed by classification trees and other crisp clustering techniques is their goal to identify mutually exclusive subsets, thus not allowing fuzzy memberships to several classes.
As mentioned before, Ebert has introduced fuzzy reasoning to software quality control [6] . For decision support, he used expert-derived knowledge in a fuzzy expert system-type classification scheme. In another work, he proposed visualization techniques for analyzing and evaluating software measures [8] . Though he visualized the measures themselves in the work, he did not provide the facility that explains the classification scheme in a visual manner. We try to provide the visualization facility to complement the Ebert's work in this work.
III. FUZZY COLORED PETRI NETS

A. Colored Petri Nets (CPN)
Petri Nets can visualize the actual system with ease due to the concurrency support and formal semantics. However, Petri Nets are so primitive that modeling complex systems is a big task. CPN have been developed by Jensen in order to overcome this limit.
CPN is a tuple CPN = ( , where finite set of non-empty types, called color sets; finite set of places; finite set of transitions; set of arcs such that node function-it is defined from into color function-it is defined from into ; guard function-it is defined from into expressions such that : [Type = Bool Type(Var arc expression function; initialization function. It is in principle easy to translate a CPN diagram into a CPN tuple and vice versa. The tuple form described above is adequate when we want to formulate general definitions and prove theorems that apply to all of CPN. The graph form is adequate when we want to construct a particular CPN that models a specific system. We use the graph form in order to help readers understand CPN intuitively. The various CPN components are discussed in the context of a small example shown in Fig. 1 .
CPN's make use of data types, data objects, and variables that hold data values. CPN data types are called color sets [related to ( )]. "Order" and "ProductShipped" in Fig. 1 are colors. CPN data objects are called tokens. There are three tokens (1'Big A place (related to P) is a location that can contain zero or more tokens (a multiset) of some particular color set. All tokens in a place must be of that color set. The CPN model in Fig. 1 contains two places, Order In and Product Out. The multiset in a place is called the marking of the place. In the CPN model in Fig. 1 , Order In has an associated multiset expression, 1'Big 2'Small. This is one of the markings of a place. Taken together, the markings in all the places in a CPN model constitute the state of the model.
A CPN transition (related to T) is an activity whose occurrence can change the number and/or value of tokens in one or more places. The model in Fig. 1 has one transition, Process Orders. An arc is a directed connection between a place and a transition. The model in Fig. 1 has two arcs. An arc that runs from a place to a transition is called an input arc, and the place it connects to is called an input place. An arc that runs from a transition to a place is called an output arc, and the place it connects is called an output place. Thus in the model in Fig. 1 , Order In is an input place and Product Out is an output place. An arc inscription is a multiset expression associated with an arc. 1'ordent is an arc inscription of the model in Fig. 1 . A guard is a Boolean expression associated with a transition. There is one guard [ordent = Big] in Fig. 1 . The assignment of token value to variables in a guard is called "binding." If each input place of a transition contains the multiset specified by the input arc inscription of the place, and the guard evaluates to true (i.e., the guard with binding is true), the transition is enabled and can occur. The behavior of a system is described in terms of transition occurring of CPN models.
B. Fuzzy Colored Petri Nets (FCPN)
As mentioned in Section I, we introduce the FCPN in order to make the fuzzy reasoning process visual and facilitate knowledge modification and validation. FCPN is one of the fuzzy Petri nets. There have been many studies on fuzzy Petri nets that are used to represent uncertain knowledge about a system state, combining fuzzy set theory and Petri net theory [13] . In classical fuzzy Petri nets, the firing of a sequence of transitions, considering the confidence factor of each one, defines a fuzzy firing sequence that is more or less likely to be fired. The fuzzy Petri nets have a certainty or confidence factor [14] , a truth-value [15] , or a truth function [16] associated with the fuzzy transitions. However, it is necessary to represent the change of membership function-type and the integration of fuzzy values as well as fuzzification, defuzzification, and chaining between rules. In addition, it would be desirable to represent knowledge in more intuitive manner. Hence we have proposed a new fuzzy Petri net model based on CPN [7] , called a FCPN. Thus the definitions and behaviors can be formally described based on those of CPN as follows.
1) Definition (FCPN):
FCPN is a ten-tuple FCPN = ( , satisfying the requirements as follows.
• The definitions of ( , and are the same as those for CPN's described in the previous subsection and [7] .
• The definition of G' is newly introduced for FCPN. It is defined from into (Method), IntF(DOI) which is a set of special guard expressions that denote characteristics of transitions. represents "normal," does "fuzzy," and DOI does the degree of importance of evaluation items. In order to distinguish from the special guards, we call the guards defined by G general guards. FCPN's can model all the situations that CPN's can model. This is because an FCPN keeps all of the properties and architecture of a CPN. Hence the behavior of an FCPN is similar to that of a CPN. However, an FCPN has special transitions shown in Fig. 2 . We can identify these transitions with the special guard expressions attached to them. Once the special guards are attached, it is not allowed to attach any general guard to a transition. Thus the special transitions make FCPN's behave differently from CPN. Instead of evaluating a binding, special guards just say the type of the corresponding transition. The rest of this section describes the behavior of the FCPN induced by the special transitions.
FCPN can handle transitions from normal places to fuzzy places and transitions from fuzzy places to normal places. Therefore, we can implement fuzzification and defuzzification with FCPN. We use the term "normal" in order to refer to the elements of FCPN that are the same as those of a CPN. Fig. 2(a) describes a normal to fuzzy transition that represents the fuzzification. Note that the color of the input place is and that of output place is This shows us that an FCPN represents the fuzzification with a transition from normal variable to a pair of normal variable and fuzzy variable. Here is a type of fuzzy variable that is declared at the declaration part of an FCPN model. Fuzzy variables are declared with a few predefined expressions. Fig. 3 exemplifies the declarations of fuzzy variables.
Small/Big,2 in Fig. 3(a) represents that the fuzzy variable has a membership function of triangular or trapezoid type, the labels are Small and Big, and the intersection is 2.
in Fig. 3(b) represents that the fuzzy variable has a membership function of bell type and the medium is is the fuzziness parameter of the membership function. Fig. 2 (b) describes a fuzzy-to-normal transition that represents the defuzzification. In a reverse manner, FCPN represents the defuzzification with a transition from a pair of normal variable and fuzzy variable to normal variable. There are various defuzzification methods. The special guard expression (Method) specifies the defuzzification method applied to the corresponding transition.
The fuzzy-to-fuzzy transition shown in Fig. 2(c) represents the transformation between a fuzzy variable and another fuzzy variable. In case the type of input fuzzy variable is different from that of an output variable, the fuzzy-to-fuzzy transition changes a membership function type. In other cases, the transition plays the same roles as those of traditional fuzzy Petri nets.
We predict the risk of software through integrating hazard severity and hazard possibility. Here we need to represent the special transition for the integration of fuzzy variables. The special fuzzy transition is named as integral fuzzy transition (IntF) in this work because Sugeno fuzzy integral is applied in order to integrate a few fuzzy values [17] . be 0.3, and be 0.2. Then we assume that and Now, we can evaluate the integrated subjectivity value by the definition of Sugeno fuzzy integral as follows:
where represents "max" operator and a "min" operator. We need to recall that as indicated by Kandel [18] , Sugeno's fuzzy integral can be interpreted as a "weighted median." The evaluation values are tokens on input places of the integral fuzzy transition. The degree of importance (DOI) of evaluation items is declared on the special guard.
In this work, a hazard severity or possibility is identically defined with the single bell type of membership function as follows [4] : (1) where and are parameters. The parameter helps in normalizing and the parameter is related to fuzziness. That is, an estimate of hazard severity or possibility is represented in the form of the severity or possibility estimate and its fuzziness. In (1), one would notice that and Therefore, (1) does satisfy the condition that there exists a possibility that a system may cause hazardous states certainly. At the same time, it allows that there exists also a possibility that the system may not cause hazardous states at all. Thus this membership function (1) would help us in providing a more realistic model. Tables I and II exemplify natural language expressions about the hazard severity estimate and the hazard possibility estimate, respectively, and the correspondences between various terms of natural languages and the representative values of the parameter described in (1). Table III exemplifies natural language expressions of fuzziness of the estimates and the correspondence between these expressions and the parameter When the severity or possibility is expressed by natural language, the corresponding parameters are selected from Tables I-III. Fig. 4 illustrates the integration of membership functions. Here, we assume that g( Hazard Severity ) = 0.5, g( Hazard Possibility ) = 0.5. Compared with hazard severity shown in Fig. 4(a) , the estimated subjective risk, which is represented with thin line in Fig. 4(c) , gains additional area on the left-hand side. This is by virtue of the effect of hazard possibility shown in Fig. 4(b) . In order to compensate the gain, the graph in Fig. 4(a) is shifted to be equivalent in view of area. The equivalent membership function is drawn thick in Fig. 4(c) . The corresponding parameter, is selected based on the equivalent membership function. The fuzziness parameter, is the same as that of hazard severity and hazard possibility. The identical process may be applied to the same type of subjectivity values, for example, subjective risk values. Conclusively, an estimate of risk is expressed in the form of the safety estimate and its fuzziness. Table IV exemplifies natural language expressions about the risk estimate and the correspondence between various terms of natural language and the representative values of the parameter x0 described in (1).
FCPN's can be more formally described in terms of the transition occurring in FCPN models as follows: All of the variables that are associated with a transition are bound to colors of their respective types. A transition is enabled by binding if each of its input places has at least those tokens that the corresponding arc expression evaluates to under the binding and the general guard expression associated with the transition evaluates to true under the binding Particularly, if a transition has a special guard expression described above, instead of evaluation of the guard expression, the output arc expression evaluates to under the binding This means that the behavior of FCPN associated with transitions that have a special guard is similar to that of high-level fuzzy Petri nets [19] . The most common inference pattern in fuzzy reasoning states that from the propositions is IF is THEN is we can deduce is where and are variables that take their value in the base sets and , respectively, and are fuzzy subsets of and , respectively, and and are approximations of and respectively. According to the inference scheme, the rule induces a fuzzy relation over The proposition can be obtained by evaluating where denotes the inference rule defined by denotes a norm. Each place may or may not contain a token associated with a fuzzy object (fuzzy set or fuzzy relation), just like tokens are associated with colors in CPN. Each arc is associated with a label that represents a fuzzy object and indicates the type of information that is required to fire a transition. The special guard expressions describe the operation to be performed on the input fuzzy object to produce the output fuzzy object. The relationship between an input fuzzy object and output fuzzy object could be, for example, expressions used to apply sup composition, membership function transformation, Sugeno fuzzy integral, etc. An enabled transition is said to fire, or occur, when it removes those tokens evaluated by the arc expressions from each of the corresponding input places. The tokens added to the output places of a transition depend upon the value of the corresponding output arc expression value under the current binding of the transition. Propositions and can be modeled as shown in Fig. 5 .
The FCPN equivalent of the firing sequence of CPN transitions is the firing or occurrence sequence of occurrence elements where an occurrence element is an ordered pair of a transition and one of its bindings. A marking is said to be directly reachable from another marking if there exists an occurrence element which when it occurs while the FCPN is in results in A marking is said to be reachable from another marking if there exists an occurrence sequence which when it occurs while the FCPN is in results in
IV. SAFETY CLASSIFICATION METHOD
We propose, in this work, a new safety classification method based on measurement data that can be obtained at the early development stage (i.e., system design, requirements, and architecture design phase). We have proposed a few measures for the classification method, considering both the verification and validation (V&V) process and the development process. Some of the measures are from the measures that the IEEE suggested [5] . The others are newly suggested in this work in order to use the results from requirement analysis and hazard analysis. As mentioned before, using the analysis results is expected to be very helpful in the reduction of quality control costs. Table V shows the categorized measures used for the classification method.
The purpose of a software hazard analysis is to identify hazards from the development process. Thus the number of identified hazards can be a good measure. It is related to hazard possibility. We have selected fault tree analysis as the hazard analysis method. We have defined the conservative occurrence probability on a fault tree. Using the term "conservative" means that we set up the occurrence probability of basic events as 10 evenly. The purpose of this measurement is to estimate relative occurrence possibility of top node events. Thus it will not be problematic to apply uniform probability in this case. The conservative occurrence probability is the top event occurrence probability that is calculated based on the basic event probabilities in the manner described in Fig. 6 . If a few nodes (i.e., child nodes) are linked to its parent node with AND gate, the occurrence probability of the parent node becomes the product of the occurrence probabilities of the child nodes. On the contrary, in case of the nodes linked with OR gate, the sum of the occurrence probabilities of the child nodes produces that of the parent node. This measure is related to hazard possibility. We have proposed another measure from hazard analysis, the top event severity. It inevitably depends on the severity of the mishap that the top event affects. For example, if the severity of a mishap that occurs due to a top event is very high, the top event severity is very high. Generally, severity of a mishap is a unique property of a system and the severity boundaries among mishaps are often fuzzy, not crisp. Thus, this measure is obtained from system experts in linguistic terms. In that the more severe a mishap is, the more severe hazards related to the mishap are, the measure is related to hazard severity.
The purpose of requirements analysis is to reveal requirement errors. Thus it is natural to choose the number of requirement errors as a measure from requirements analysis. Requirement errors consist of errors due to inconsistencies, errors due to incompleteness, and errors due to misinterpretation. Inconsistency results from the inadequate mappings from the same specification item to more than one differing requirement. Incompleteness results from the decomposition elements that do not completely reflect the system requirement specification. On the other hand, misinterpretation results from the decomposition elements that do not correctly reflect the system requirement specification. The number of requirement errors is related to hazard possibility.
We have selected two measures among those that can be obtained from development process. They are required software reliability (RSR) [5] and project initiation reliability prediction (PIRP) [5] . RSR provides a measure that makes visible the tradeoffs of cost and degree of reliability. Required reliability ratings are "very low," "low," "nominal," "high," and "very high." These ratings are expressed with linguistic terms. For example, the effect of a failure of software with a "very high" rating can be the loss of human life. Example software systems are military command/control systems or nuclear reactor control systems. This measure is related to hazard severity. On the other hand, PIRP is used to predict software reliability in terms of the fault density based on the character of the application development environment and the software implementation techniques. This measure is related to hazard possibility. Now we are ready to describe the safety classification method. Developing a classification method consists of the following elements [20] . 1) A measure vector based on n selected features that contain enough information to describe the object in the applications' domain.
exists Fig. 6 . An example fault tree and the conservative occurrence probability. for each software component under investigation, thus resulting in a definite representation of each component in the -dimensional measure space. In this work we define as a set of measures from hazard analysis and requirement analysis (i.e., number of identified hazards, conservative occurrence probability, top event severity, and number of requirement errors). In other words, is a vector number of identified hazards, conservative occurrence probability, top event severity, number of requirement errors 2) A quality factor vector F that consists of single attribute of software that contributes to quality. can be defined as a type of measure that provides a direct measure of software quality. Elements of are often discrete. Human experts supply them, hence they are fuzzy in nature. When combinations of features are to be considered, their comprehensibility to human experts must be taken into account. Usually is unknown during the project development and therefore highest interest lies in its early and accurate prediction. is defined as a vector risk 3) A set of validating data (validating vector that should provide information about the degree to which given software possesses the quality attributes that are collected in As mentioned before, other studies suggested quality control methods based on the measurement data from other projects that have been already performed. They chose the data set to have values such as number of errors or MTTF of a given group of software components. However, in this work, we tried to classify software components using direct measures from on-going projects. Thus, it is very important that is self-evident enough to intuitively explain rule vector Note that the measure vector consists of the data from hazard analysis and requirement analysis (i.e., verification and validation process). On the other hand, the validating vector consists of "required software reliability (RSR)" and "project initiation reliability prediction (PIRP)" that are the data from development process. In order to construct and evaluate a classification method, the data sets and need to be divided into two mutually exclusive sets before the classification process takes place. 4) A set of patterns (rule vector that reflect the experts' knowledge about how to assign data sets to target classes in Such patterns consist of rules for differentiating between members and nonmembers of a distinct target class.
Most of the facts and rules that belong to human expertise contain fuzzy predicates and thus are fuzzy propositions. This is particularly true of heuristic rules that often used in the management of software projects. Because all the factors in software development management are vague and imprecise, an alternative method must be used in order to permit approximate reasoning from vague inputs. We selected fuzzy reasoning as the alternative. As mentioned in [6] , in order to permit rule-based approximate reasoning based on external input data from software products or documents and vague knowledge about the underlying development process, it is necessary to permit the formulation of fuzzy rules. We proposed a reasoning process in order to offer a way to the formulation of fuzzy rules. The reasoning process is similar to that of [6] and consists of the following steps. 1) Describe an exactly defined process environment from which the software products under investigation are selected. 2) Select a group of expert development staffs who will be asked to develop a consensus concerning measurement data and quality factors This jury should consist of people with respected knowledge in the areas. 3) Select a random sample of software components from the environment. 4) Have the jury classify these software items with respect to the factors in by comparing and evaluating them. Each case must be explained exactly in order to permit a repeatable classification. 5) Let the experts condense these explanations to a set of recursively refined rules The rules are usually dominated by fuzzy, nevertheless precise, linguistic and qualitative descriptions in opposition to qualitative selection formulas that might be preferable on the first sight. Let them use FCPN models in refining 6) Validate by classifying the software items based on according to the same factors and observing if the classification results are the same as the results that are intuitively expected. 7) Construct a FCPN model that reflects the relationships among and The FCPN model must contain a FCPN that represent finally refined rules 8) Classify all the software items in the environment by using the full-scope FCPN model. Compared with the reasoning process proposed in [6] , the above process is different in the following two points: First, while the process of [6] classifies the additionally selected software items in order to validate the above process classifies the software items that are selected at the beginning. Secondly, the reasoning process proposed in this work enforces the use of FCPN models in order to visualize the refinement of and the relationships among and Once the FCPN model is constructed, the risk is evaluated through the simulation of the model. This is the final step Ebert and Baisch evaluate different techniques in this area [21] . Five common classification techniques for identifying critical components were evaluated in their study, namely Pareto classification, classification trees, factor-based discriminant analysis, fuzzy classification, and neural networks. They have defined four different evaluation criteria for comparison that cover both predictive accuracy and effectiveness of the prediction: Prediction Correctness, Low type I misclassification, High Prediction Quality, and High Prediction Effectiveness. For the evaluation, they investigated a sample of 451 modules.
Although fuzzy classification ranked lowest in view of Prediction Correctness, it did highest in view of the other criteria. Therefore, it can at least be said that our approach is more effective than the four other representative methods in view of Low type I misclassification, High Prediction Quality, and High Prediction Effectiveness. Furthermore, fuzzy expert systems are superior in terms of using intuitive design knowledge for classifying modules as Ebert and Baisch mentioned in [21] . However, it is necessary to improve fuzzy expert systems so that software engineering experts and normal users may accept them. Our approach using FCPN can solve this problem because FCPN are an explanation facility that provides how the conclusion is arrived at and how the classification inference engine makes use of the knowledge provided by the fuzzy production rules.
V. APPLICATION EXAMPLE
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our classification method, we applied the method to a real software project. The purpose of the project is to implement the variable over power trip (VOPT) function, which is one of the functions of Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS) software for Ulchin 3&4 nuclear power plants in Korea. CPCS monitors reactor operation variables such as hot leg and cold leg temperatures, pressure, loop pump speeds, and ex-core neutron flux levels. Out of the monitored operation variables the set point for reactor trip is calculated, and if current reactor power is greater than; or equal to this set point, the system raises a trip signal. Fig. 7 shows the data flow diagram for the VOPT function.
A software engineer, who knows the CPCS software well, composes the software specification. Fig. 8 shows a part of the specification. "Spec ID" in this figure represents module name, and "Description" plays the role of specifying the relationships among system variables. For this specification, we first chose ten modules and performed a hazard analysis for them with the fault tree analysis technique. At the beginning of the analysis, we constructed a system fault tree considering the relationships among the whole modules. Then we broke down the system fault tree and built software fault trees module by module. We revealed a few hazards in the specification through the fault tree analysis. Table VI shows the revealed hazards. Table VII shows the measurement data from the fault tree analysis for the CPCS software specification.
Separately from the hazard analysis, analysis for the specification itself was performed in view of completeness and consistency. The requirement analysis was to model the specification with CPN and analyze the model. We used CPN because it proved to be an effective analysis tool owing to its visualization capability and formal semantics as mentioned in Section III. Although requirement analyses typically do not reveal all the hazards in specifications, the requirement analysis performed in this work revealed all the hazards that are revealed through the hazard analysis. The analysis revealed additional defects as shown in Table VIII. Table VII shows the measurement data from the requirement analysis as well as those from the hazard analysis. This means that we have prepared the measure vector and all the corresponding measurement data. For the validation of the rule vector the values for the validating vector (i.e., {RSR, PIRP}) should be determined. We obtained the values from the engineers who have ever participated or are participating in the development of CPCS software. They are in terms of failure rate and shown in Table IX .
After getting the measurement data for creating the quality model and for the validation, the classification method required us to define membership functions for the linguistic variables for the measures. In this step, we used symmetrical triangular or trapezoid functions because these functions are easy to understand. We assigned only two membership functions for labels "Small" and "Big" for the linguistic variables representing the measures. Fig. 3(a) shows the membership function for the number of identified hazards. We determined the shapes of the membership functions (i.e., intersection and tilt) based on experts' knowledge.
Of course, it is natural that the shapes of the membership functions for the measures are different from one another. In other words, the scale and degree of fuzziness may be different measure by measure. Thus we introduced a concept of "shaping factor" to the membership functions in order to relate individual measures to quality factors. The transformation of the membership functions enabled us to realize introducing the shaping factor. Through the transformation we could scale the measure ranges to [0, 1] . In addition, we could express the degree of fuzziness of membership functions, which varies in different projects, with ease. This will become a very important task when we try to apply the classification to other projects. Fig. 3 (b) shows the transformed membership function corresponding to the number of identified hazards. The quality factor, which the transformed membership function represents, is named as NIH. We performed the same tasks for conservative occurrence probability (defined as COP) and number of requirement errors (defined as NRE). These quality factors have similar natural language expressions to those shown in Table II . As a simple illustration of this point, Fig. 3 describes a situation that we considered a fact: "If the number of identified hazards is big, the NIH of the software component is high (with medium fuzziness)." If the number of identified hazards is small, at Fig. 3 (b) will be shifted to the left. Note that the measure "top event severity" already has this type of membership function.
In this work, we defined a three-fold quality factor vector The first level quality factor vector is defined as NIH, COP, NRE This means that the fuzzification and the membership function transformation are only applied to the three measures except 'top event severity.' We also defined the second level quality factor vector as Possibility, Top event severity The final vector is Risk Fig. 9 illustrates the relationships among measure or quality factor vectors. As shown in Fig. 9 , it is necessary to set up the rule vector to have three layers. Building up the rule vector, we noted that a fuzzy rule with linguistic expressions might have different membership function shapes. We recursively refined the shapes of membership functions through experts' knowledge. Fig. 10 shows the rule vector Then we validated Due to the properties of the determined the validation focused on where the represents the relationship among severity, top event possibility and risk. Finally, we constructed a FCPN model that describes the whole procedure of the classification. Fig. 11 shows the simplified top-level FCPN model. The simulation of the FCPN model offered the classification results. When one of the measurement data arrives at the corresponding place as a token, the value is fuzzified through a normal to fuzzy transition. The token in the next place has a fuzzy linguistic term of which membership is determined by a pre-defined membership function. The transformation of a membership function occurs in a token by token manner. In other words, the linguistic term at an input place changes into a different linguistic term that the corresponding rule specifies. On the other hand, the integration of membership functions occurs in a totally different manner. When all the input tokens arrive at their places, the transition first determines the shape of membership function of output token in the manner described in Fig. 4 . Then the corresponding output token is generated in the same manner as that of the transformation. Conclusively, the linguistic term at the final output place shows the class that a software item should belong to. Table X shows the classification results.
Although VOPT_P max and VOPT_JTRP have very similar properties in view of safety, they belong to different class from that of each other. This results from the difference in conservative occurrence probability. The classification result on PMS_DataLink and Idle_Time is identical to the result based on the validating vector.
Assume that there are a few conflict rules in our rule vector During the construction of the FCPN model, we could easily verify and modify the rules. In a transformation of a membership function, if a rule does not contribute to the formation of the transformed membership function, it is probably in conflict with other rules. In an integration of membership functions, we can find conflict rules in the same manner. The FCPN model constructed in this work may be used for other projects without severe changes. Furthermore, if we change a part of (i.e., from "number of requirement error" to "number of design error" or "number of code error"), we can classify the software items in other development stages by using the same FCPN model.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
High quality is indispensable to instrumentation and control systems used in nuclear science or engineering fields. Generally, a proper quality control method determines the quality of systems. Thus, it is necessary to develop a quality control method for acquiring "good quality.'" In this work, a software classification technique has been proposed as the quality control method. We focused on software quality because it is the core of NI&C systems.
We have tried to classify software items based on the measurement data from one on-going project. In order to realize the purpose, we defined the measure vector with the measurement data from hazard analysis and requirement analysis. Furthermore, we selected the validating vector with the data that can be obtained from the development process itself. In addition, we tried to integrate the measurement and the verification because the measurement is an additional burden for the designers.
Fuzzy logic provided a natural conceptual framework for representation of knowledge related to the risks of software items. FCPN helped us manage the case systematically through offering a formal framework for the classification. Through this work, we confirmed the necessity of applying fuzzy concepts to the areas of measurement based software classification and quality control. In addition, through the example application to the real software project, the classification method proved to be feasible and we concluded that high-quality NI&C systems could be developed effectively and used safely through the quality control method.
In spite of its successful application, the classification has a few weak points. One of them is related to the determination of membership functions. The classification method proposes a lot of management for membership functions. Thus the classification results are sensitive to membership functions. In other words, the quality of membership functions determines the quality of the classification results much too dominantly. Another weak point is also related to the management of membership functions. The weak point is the difficulty of the simulation of the FCPN model. In order to overcome the weak point, we are planning to implement FCPN on Design/CPN, which is an automated tool for CPN modeling and analysis. Design/CPN supports the simulation of CPN models, thus, if FCPN is successfully implemented on Design/CPN, the simulation of FCPN may be effectively performed with Design/CPN.
